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Unless our universe is decaying at an astronomical rate (i.e., on the present cosmological timescale
of Gigayears, rather than on the quantum recurrence timescale of googolplexes), it would apparently
produce an infinite number of observers per comoving volume by thermal or vacuum fluctuations
(Boltzmann brains). If the number of ordinary observers per comoving volume is finite, this scenario
seems to imply zero likelihood for us to be ordinary observers and minuscule likelihoods for our actual
observations. Hence, our observations suggest that this scenario is incorrect and that perhaps our
universe is decaying at an astronomical rate.
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“The most incomprehensible thing about the world is
that it is comprehensible,” according to Einstein. This
mystery has both a philosophical level [1] and a scientific
level. The scientific level of the mystery is the question
of how observers within the universe have ordered obser-
vations and comprehensions of the universe.
If observers within the universe were sufficiently dom-
inated by those that are thermal or vacuum fluctuations
(Boltzmann brains [2, 3, 4] or BBs), rather than by ordi-
nary observers (OOs) that arise from nonequilibrium pro-
cesses like Darwinian evolution by natural selection, then
the probability would be very near unity that a random
observer would be such a BB. However, the observations
and thoughts of such observers would be very unlikely to
have the degree of order we experience. Therefore, if our
observations can be interpreted to be those of random
observers, our ordered observations would be statistical
evidence against any theory in which BBs greatly domi-
nate. A theory in which the universe lasts too long after
a finite period of OOs is in danger of being such a theory
that is statistically inconsistent with observation.
This argument, a cosmic variant of the doomsday ar-
gument [5], uses a version of the Copernican Principle
or Vilenkin’s Principle of Mediocrity (PM) [6], such as
Bostrom’s [7] Strong Self-Sampling Assumption (SSSA):
“One should reason as if one’s present observer-moment
were a random sample from the set of all observer-
moments in its reference class.” This is similar to how
I might today state my Conditional Aesthemic Principle
(CAP) [8]: “Unless one has compelling contrary evidence,
one should reason as if one’s conscious perception were a
random sample from the set of all conscious perceptions.”
I would argue that the reference class of all observer-
moments (which I would call conscious perceptions, each
being all that one is consciously aware of at once) should
be the universal class of all observer-moments, but for
the present paper it is sufficient to take any reasonable
restriction of the reference class.
For example, consider the reference class of scien-
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tists observing the galaxy-galaxy correlation function
(GGCF) [9]. This would almost certainly be only a very
tiny fraction of all observer-moments for BBs and pre-
sumably a much larger (but still small) fraction of all
observer-moments for OOs. However, if the BBs suffi-
ciently dominate, most scientists observing the GGCF
would be BBs rather than OOs. Then within this refer-
ence class, we could compare the likelihoods that various
theories give the observed GGCF. For BB theories that
predict that almost all observer-moments within this ref-
erence class are BBs, we would expect that almost all
of the “observed” GGCFs would be highly disordered, so
the likelihood of our observed GGCF would be very much
smaller than in OO theories in which most observer-
moments within the same reference class are OOs. There-
fore, unless we take the prior probability for BB theories
to be extremely near unity, our observed GGCF would be
strong statistical evidence that the posterior probability
for BB theories should be taken to be very small.
In simple terms, our observations of order (e.g., a com-
prehensible world) statistically rule out BB theories in
which observers formed by thermal or vacuum fluctua-
tions greatly dominate over ordinary observers.
If we have a theory for a finite-sized universe that has
ordinary observers for only a finite period of time (e.g.,
during the lifetime of stars and nearby planets where the
ordinary observers evolve), each of which makes only a
finite number of observations (perhaps mostly ordered),
then the universe would have only a finite number of or-
dinary observers with their largely ordered observations.
On the other hand, if such a theory predicts that the
universe lasts for an infinite amount of time, then one
would expect from vacuum fluctuations an infinite num-
ber of observers (almost all extremely short-lived, with
very little ordered memory) and observations (almost en-
tirely with minuscule order or comprehension). Such a
BB theory would give a much smaller likelihood of our
actual observations than an OO theory (in which BB’s
do not dominate over OOs) and so would be discredited.
Therefore, a good theory for a finite-sized universe ap-
parently should also predict that it have a finite life-
time. (For example, this was a property of the k = +1
Friedmann-Robertson-Walker dust model universes.)
2For an infinite universe (infinite spatial volume in one
connected region, or an infinite number of connected re-
gions in a suitable multiverse picture of the universe [10]),
which is predicted to be produced by eternal inflation
[11, 12, 13], the argument is not so clear. In this case
one could get an infinite number of both ordinary obser-
vations and disordered observations, and then there may
be different ways of taking the ratio to give the likeli-
hoods of the possible observations within each reference
class [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22].
For example, one may [15] define the probability Pj for
an observation to be the product Pj = pjfj of the proba-
bility pj for a particular pocket universe and of the prob-
ability fj of the observation within that pocket. Here
I shall assume that fj is regulated by taking the ratio
of different kinds of observations within a fixed comov-
ing volume of the pocket universe. This would give the
right answer for any finite bubble universe, no matter
how large, but of course it is an untested ansatz to apply
this procedure to an open or infinite bubble universe.
With this assumption, the prospect of BB produc-
tion then leads one to conclude that any model universe
should not last forever if it has only a finite time period
where ordinary observers dominate [23], though it must
be noted that other regularization schemes do not lead
to this conclusion [15, 20, 21]. However, here we shall
assume observations within a given pocket universe are
regulated by taking a finite comoving volume.
The next question is what limits on the lifetime can
be deduced from this argument. In [23] it was implicitly
assumed that the universe lasted for some definite time
t and then ended. Then the requirement was that the
number of vacuum fluctuation observations per comoving
volume during that time not greatly exceed the number
of ordered observations during the finite time that ordi-
nary observers exist. For any power-law expansion with
exponent of order unity, and using a conservative action
of 1050 for a 1 kg brain to last 0.1 seconds, I predicted
[23] that the universe would not last past t ∼ e1050 years,
and for an universe that continues to grow exponentially
with a doubling time of the order of 10 Gyr, I predicted
that the universe would not last past about 1060 years.
If instead one used what I now believe is a more realistic
action of 1042 for a 1 kg brain to be separated by 30 cm
from the corresponding antimatter [24, 25, 26], then the
corresponding times would be t ∼ e1042 years and 1052
years respectively.
Here I wish to emphasize that the expected lifetime
should be much shorter if the universe is expanding ex-
ponentially and just has a certain decay rate for tunneling
into oblivion. Then the decay rate should be sufficient to
prevent the expectation value of the surviving 4-volume,
per comoving 3-volume, from diverging and leading to an
infinite expectation value of vacuum fluctuation observa-
tions per comoving 3-volume. Since this minimum decay
rate is set by the asymptotic cosmological expansion rate
of the universe, it may be said to be astronomical (huge
on the scale of the quantum recurrence time [27].)
Suppose [25] that the decay of the universe proceeds
at the rate, per 4-volume, of A for the nucleation of a
small bubble that then expands at practically the speed
of light, destroying everything within the causal future
of the bubble nucleation event. Then if one takes some
event p within the background spacetime, the probability
that the spacetime would have survived to that event is
P (p) = e−AV4(p), where V4(p) is the spacetime 4-volume
to the past of the event p in the background spacetime.
Then the requirement that there not be an infinite expec-
tation value of vacuum fluctuation observations within
a finite comoving 3-volume is the requirement that the
4-volume within the comoving region, weighted by the
survival probability P (p) for each point, be finite rather
than infinite. For an asymptotically de Sitter background
spacetime with cosmological constant Λ, the expectation
value of the 4-volume of the surviving spacetime is finite
if and only if [25]
A > Amin =
9
4pi
H4Λ =
Λ2
4pi
>∼ (20 Gyr)−4 = e−562.5, (1)
using H0 = 72 ± 8 km/s/Mpc from the Hubble Space
Telescope key project [28] and ΩΛ = 0.72±0.04 from the
third-year WMAP results of [29] to get HΛ = H0
√
ΩΛ.
For a universe that is spatially flat and has its energy
density dominated by the cosmological constant and by
nonrelativistic matter, as ours now seems to be, its k = 0
FRW metric may be written as
ds2 = T 2[−dτ2 + (sinh4/3 τ)(dr2 + r2dΩ2)], (2)
where T = 2/(3HΛ). This gives a survival probability
P (τ) = exp
[
−16
27
A
Amin
∫ τ
0
dx sinh2 x
(∫ τ
x
dy
sinh2/3 y
)3]
(3)
With the present earth population of nearly 7 billion,
this would give a minimal expected death rate of about
7 persons per century. (Of course, it could not be 7
persons in one century, but all 7 billion with a probability
of about one in a billion per century.) It also gives an
upper limit on the present half-life of our universe of [25]
19 Gyr.
Although there are no observations that directly rule
out the suggestion here that our universe is decaying
at an astronomical rate (more likely than not to decay
within 20 billion years), this suggestion is surprising and
would itself result in various mysteries. For example,
it would leave it unexplained why the decay rate A is
greater than Amin ≈ (20 Gyr)−4 and yet not so great to
make it highly improbable that our universe has lasted as
long as it has. There might be a factor of 1000 window
for the allowed A, but if, for example, the decay rate
is given by Eq. (5.20) of [30], this translates into only
a 0.6% variation in the allowed value of the gravitino
mass [25], which seems unnaturally restrictive. Further-
more, even if the annihilation rate A can be within this
range for our part of the multiverse, it would still leave
3it unexplained why it is not less than Amin in some other
part of the multiverse that also allows observers to be
produced by vacuum fluctuations. If it were less in any
such part of the multiverse, then it would seem that that
part would have an infinite number of vacuum fluctuation
observations that is in danger of swamping the ordered
observations in our part.
Because of these potential problems with the predic-
tion suggested here (that the universe seems likely to
decay within 20 billion years), one might ask how this
prediction could be circumvented.
One obvious idea is that the current acceleration of the
universe is not due to a cosmological constant that would
last forever if the universe itself did not decay away. Per-
haps the current acceleration is instead caused by the en-
ergy density of a scalar field that is slowly rolling down a
gentle slope of its potential [23, 31]. However, this seems
to raise its own issue of fine tuning, since although the ob-
servership selection effect can perhaps explain the small
value of the potential, it does not seem to give any ob-
vious explanation of why the slope should also be small,
unless the scalar field is actually sitting at the bottom of a
potential minimum (effectively a cosmological constant).
Another possibility is that the normalization employed
in this paper to get a finite number of ordinary observers,
namely to restrict to a finite comoving volume, might not
be the correct procedure if our universe really has infinite
spatial volume. This is indeed the conclusion of several
authors [15, 20, 21].
For example, Bousso and Freivogel [20] have recently
argued that the paradox does not arise in the local
description [32] (unless the decay time is much, much
longer) and is evidence against the global description
of the multiverse. On the other hand, both Linde [21]
and Vilenkin [15] have more recently given examples of
how one may avoid the dreaded “invasion of Boltzmann
brains” within their global description.
Linde’s solution [21] is analogous to the following sit-
uation [25]. Consider imaginary humans who have a
‘youthful’ phase of 100 years of life with frequent and
mostly ordered observations, followed by a ‘senile’ phase
of trillions of years of infrequent and mostly disordered
observations. Assume that the trillions of years are suf-
ficient to give many more total ‘senile’ disordered ob-
servations than ‘youthful’ ordered observations for each
human. One might think that most observations would
then be disordered, so that someone’s having an ordered
observation (which would thus be very unlikely under
this scenario) could count as evidence against the theory
giving this scenario. However, if the population growth
rate of such humans is sufficiently high that at each time
the number of youthful humans and their ordered obser-
vations outnumbers the senile humans and their disor-
dered observations, Linde’s solution is that at each time
the probability is higher that an observation would be
ordered than that it would be disordered.
With the same aim, Vilenkin argues [15] that since
BBs are equilibrium quantum fluctuation processes, they
should be lumped with bubbles in being calculated by the
factor pj in Pj = pjfj rather than by the factor fj , which
he suggests should be restricted to observations formed
by nonequilibrium processes. Then he notes that when
BBs are counted in pj , they are dominated by bio-friendly
bubbles that are also counted in pj , since each such open
bubble gives an infinite universe and an infinite number
of OOs. He concludes, “As a result, freak observers [BBs]
get a vanishing relative weight.”
I agree that these solutions are possible ways to reg-
ulate the infinity of observations that occur in a uni-
verse that expands forever, but they do not yet seem
very natural [22]. The problem arises from the fact that
if the youthful humans or OOs are always at late times
to outnumber the senile humans or BBs, the population
of these fictitious humans, or the volume of the universe
in the original example, must continue growing forever,
producing an infinite number of both youthful and senile
fictitious humans or of both OOs and BBs in cosmology.
Then it is ambiguous how one takes the ratio, which is
the fundamental problem with trying to solve the mea-
sure problem in theories with eternal inflation.
Of course, the fact that we have ordered observations
and are almost certainly not Boltzmann brains is strong
evidence against what I have here proposed as a natural
way of using volume weighting in the global viewpoint
(unless the universe has a half-life less than 20 billion
years [25]). So in comparison with the observations, my
proposal of regulating by comoving volume is definitely
worse than the other prescriptions [15, 20, 21], unless the
universe really is decaying at an astronomical rate.
So if the prediction suggested in this paper (that our
universe seems likely to decay within 20 billion years)
is wrong, it may be part of our general lack of under-
standing of the measure in the multiverse. On the other
hand, despite the fine-tuning problems mentioned above,
it is not obvious to me that it really is wrong, so one
might want to take it seriously unless and until some
other really natural way is found to avoid our ordered
observations being swamped by disordered observations
from vacuum fluctuations.
One might ask what the observable effects would be
of the decay of the universe, if ordinary observers like
us could otherwise survive for times long in comparison
with 20 billion years.
First of all, the destruction of the universe would likely
occur by a very thin bubble wall traveling extremely close
to the speed of light, so no one would be able to see it
coming to dread the imminent destruction. Furthermore,
the destruction of all we know (our nearly flat spacetime,
as well as all of its contents of particles and fields) would
happen so fast that there is not likely to be nearly enough
time for any signals of pain to reach our brains. And no
grieving survivors will be left behind. So in this way it
would be the most humanely possible execution.
Furthermore, in an Everett many-worlds version of
quantum theory (e.g., [8]), the universe will always per-
sist in some fraction of the Everett worlds (better, in
4some measure), but it is just that the fraction or measure
will decrease asymptotically toward zero. This means
that there is always some positive measure for observers
to survive until any arbitrarily late fixed time, so one
could never absolutely rule out a decaying universe by
observations at any finite time, though sufficiently late
ordinary observers would have good statistical grounds
for doubting the astronomical decay rate suggested here.
In any case, the decrease in the measure of the uni-
verse that I am suggesting here takes such a long time
that it should not cause anyone to worry (except to try
to find a solution to the huge scientific mystery of the
measure for the string landscape or other multiverse the-
ory). However, it is interesting that the discovery of the
cosmic acceleration [33, 34] may not teach us that the
universe will certainly last much longer than the possible
finite lifetimes of k = +1 matter-dominated FRW mod-
els previously considered, but it may instead have the
implication that our universe is actually decaying astro-
nomically faster than what was previously considered.
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